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Abstract
Purpose – Prior literature provides clear evidence that the judgments of experts differ from those of
non-experts. For example, Smith and Kida concluded that the extent of common biases that they
investigated often are reduced when experts perform job related tasks as compared to students.
The aim in this theoretical study is to examine whether “heuristic biases significantly moderate the
understanding of experts versus novices in the going concern judgment?”
Design/methodology/approach – The authors address the posited question by marshalling extant
literature on expert and novice judgments and link these to concepts drawn from the cognitive sciences
through the Brunswick Lens Model.
Findings – The authors identify a number of heuristics that may bias the going concern decision,
based on the work of Kahneman and Tversky among others. They conclude that experience mitigates
the unintentional consequences played by heuristic biases.
Practical implications – The conclusions have implications for the education and training of
auditors, and for the expectation gap. They suggest that both awareness of factors that affect
understanding of auditing reports and greater attention to training are important in reducing the
expectation gap.
Originality/value – This paper develops additional theoretical understanding of factors that
may impact the expectation gap. While there has been limited prior discussion of the impact of
cognitive factors on differences between experts and novices, the paper significantly expands the
range of factors discussed. As such, it should provide a stimulus to new research in this important
area.
Keywords Cognition, Experiential learning, Uncertainty management, Training
Paper type Conceptual paper

Objective
Prior literature provides clear evidence that the judgments of experts differ from those
of non-experts. In this paper, we seek to present new ideas for further exploration with
respect to the differences between experts and novices. Specifically, our focus in this
theoretical study is the influence of heuristic biases when examining a going concern
modified report.
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One contribution of this study is that we develop a model which can be used by
future researchers when examining and developing theory to explain factors that may
act to diminish expert performance toward the level of novices in general, and
concerning going concern tasks in particular. In addressing this issue, we introduce
many factors that have not appeared in the expert versus novice judgment literature
previously. These factors include native ability, problems in memory matching of
presenting situations to prior experiences, selective perceptions, and the affect
heuristic. The second contribution of this study is our suggestions for at least partially
overcoming the effects of the heuristics that affect the auditor’s judgment. The third
contribution consists of our suggestions for future research to understand, and
address, the problems that these heuristics cause.
In this paper, we pose the question “does training matter?” For example, would
training reduce the bias introduced by heuristics? The answer from prior research
would be that training may not matter because both novices and expert auditors are
equally influenced by heuristics (Nelson and Tan, 2005; Wüstemann and Koch, 2006).
The problem with these findings is that almost all the research used fairly structured
tasks. In order to analyze this, we examine the differences between experts and novices
relating to the going concern opinion decision, a task which is relatively unstructured.
Unlike many accounting decisions, it cannot be accomplished by applying a set of rules
to details of a specific transaction since many of the considerations that the auditor
must take into account are relatively unstructured, requiring the exercise of reasoned
and perhaps seasoned judgment to understand and evaluate. We evaluate prior
research and underpin our conclusions using an adapted Lens Brunswick Model (1955).
Our conclusions are that, in a principles-based system, training does matter because
experts are as equally affected by heuristics as novices. In a principles-based system,
therefore, it becomes important to provide training to mitigate the effects of heuristics
on going concern opinion decisions. With regard to both principles-based and
rules-based systems, problems may exist. Accordingly, we recommend specific
methods to help overcome the effects of cognitive heuristics, as well as suggestions for
improving the training that novices receive with the aim of helping them develop richer
cognitive domains to better enable them to understand presenting situations.
Background and motivation is presented in the second section of the paper.
We discuss pertinent literature and then we use prior literature to develop theory as to
why understanding of the going concern message by both experts and novices may not
differ significantly. We subsequently present our model to explain our findings and
then follow with our conclusions.
Background and motivation
Auditors are asked to attest to the fairness of historical information which is contained
in financial statements. Under Statement of Auditing Standard No. 59 (1989) in the
USA, the role of the auditor has been expanded with respect to prediction of the going
concern status of the company. The auditor now has to actively search for red flags
that could indicate possible failure. Previously, the role of the auditor could be
considered to be more passive. The auditor’s role was more of the “watchdog” rather
than “bloodhound” as is required today. The auditor only issued a going concern
modified report if s/he came across red flags during the course of the audit. They did
not need to actively search for potential problems.

Even though the role of the auditor has been expanded, does SAS No. 59 result in a
greater understanding of the message conveyed by the auditors in their report when it is
modified for going concern uncertainty? The question we pose and analyze is, “Do
heuristic biases significantly diminish the performance of experts to the level of novices
with respect to making decisions concerning the issuance of a going concern report?”
Underlying our entire discussion, of course, is the question of what we expect from
an expert. We believe it is normatively correct to say that we expect the expert to make
fact-based decisions that are superior to those of relative novices in any domain where
expertise and knowledge matter (Mayer, 2003). The problem with this formulation, of
course, is that often the evidence does not support the existence of systematic
differences in decision-making quality between experts and novices. We analyze this in
the framework of the Brunswick Lens Model (Brunswick, 1955). We use the findings of
Lundberg and Nagle (1999) to justify our rationale.
Lundberg and Nagle (1999) examined the post-decision editing of auditors’
judgment. They were interested in post-decision restructuring of a decision: did
auditors (experts) and students (novices) amend a decision to issue a going concern
decision based on feedback? If so, how and did heuristics play a role in that? Though
this research is not directly related to the objectives of this study, the findings are
pertinent and are used to substantiate a theoretical model developed here.
This paper is timely because there is a growing recognition in the financial
community that the current rule-based accounting system does little to improve
financial reporting and reduce the frequency and magnitude of accounting scandals.
Currently, much behavioural research in auditing seems to point to the fact that
auditors and novices appear to be equally influenced by heuristics, and hence could
arrive at similar, perhaps fallacious, conclusions (e.g., Nelson and Tan, 2005;
Wüstemann and Koch, 2006). Robert Herz, Chairman of the FASB, speaking at Rutgers
University (2006) stated that, in this scenario, there was a need to move from a
rule-based system to a principles-based system. However, in the current rule-based
environment, this finding has not gained traction because if accountants are simply
expected to follow rules, heuristics may play less of a role. This is because the complex
rules, regulations and procedures provide a “check the box” type environment that
structures the decision-making process, perhaps limiting the effects of the heuristics. In
the principle-based system envisaged by Robert Herz, auditors would be expected to
apply professional judgment. Hence, heuristics would play an important role since
auditors are forced to critically evaluate a situation with only general guidance, rather
than focus on a narrow application of the rules[1].
Understanding factors that auditors use in processing information is important
given the changes in our business environment. These developments primarily include
the advent of Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) in the USA and its equivalent, the Eighth
Directive in Europe and the Enron scandal in the USA and the Parmalat scandal in
Europe. To the extent that the legal environment has become more problematic for
auditors (Hanson et al., 2004), it is important to understand the factors that diminish
the accuracy of auditor understanding of the client situation, and that diminish the
adequacy of the auditor’s processing of the information that he/she believes
characterize the client’s situation. We believe that the model presented here represents
the most comprehensive exploration of cognitive factors affecting the auditor’s
judgment concerning presenting client situations.
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Literature review
Since the objective of this study is to examine and understand going concern
decision-making with particular emphasis on the differences between experts and novices,
we focus on literature that deals particularly with decision outcomes in the presence of
going concern uncertainties. In this area there are few studies that directly compare and
contrast going concern reporting decisions between experts and novices. Hence, we
dichotomize our literature review into those studies involving first, experts and second,
students. Much of the literature has used loan officers as “expert” subjects, predominantly
because they are much easier to access than auditors (LaSalle and Anandarajan, 1997). It
must be emphasized that there are many more studies involving expert subjects than
students. After the literature review, we develop a model for differentiating differences in
perceptions and reactions between both types of users. For the purpose of this study,
sophisticated users are defined as those users who have specialized training in reading and
understanding financial statements and unsophisticated users as those lacking this
specialized training or are in the process of acquiring it.
Studies involving expert subjects in the presence of going concern uncertainties
Most experimental studies, as previously mentioned, used bank loan officers (Libby
et al., 1979a, b; Bamber and Stratton, 1997; LaSalle and Anandarajan, 1997), presumably
because of their specialized training, to assess an entity’s financial condition, expected
future cash flows and going concern status. An additional advantage to using loan
officers is that they are likely to have similar training and make similar decisions. It has
also been suggested that any results using loan officers can be generalized to other
sophisticated financial statement users. Other studies used financial analysts as
“experts” (Reckers and Pany, 1979; Pany and Smith, 1982; Robertson, 1988). While
auditors have been used as subjects in many studies, the objectives of those studies did
not specifically deal with the going concern judgment in an “expert” versus “student”
context and hence, could not be included here. The key studies relevant to this paper will
be considered in chronological order.
Libby (1979a, b), categorized his sample of loan officers into two groups: one group
was provided with an unqualified report and the other with a qualified “subject to”
report. The results showed that the qualified report did not significantly increase users’
perceptions of risk of their clients. Johnson et al. (1983) studied loan officers’ reactions
to four different scenarios: three different reports and a situation in which no audit
report was provided. In all instances the financial statements were the same. Therefore,
any difference had to be attributed to the report. The reports provided were the
compilation report, review report and audit report. The authors did not find any
statistically significant differences in decision-making concerning the granting of the
loan or the interest rate, thus further corroborating the conclusions of Libby (1979a, b)
that the wording of a report did not influence judgment once the requisite financial
information had been provided.
Robertson (1988) conducted an experiment to test the communication effectiveness
of the “subject to” reports and other qualified reports. He provided a case study to six
groups of financial analysts. The financial statements were held constant so that the
only difference between the groups was the type of audit report issued. The six reports
included a “subject to” audit report and a disclaimer for uncertainties. The subjects
were also given a standard unqualified opinion. The analysts were asked to react to the

financial statements in light of the audit reports. The reactions of interest included the
subject’s view of the statements’ credibility, their willingness to rely on the statements,
and the extent to which the statements satisfied their information needs. Except for the
disclaimer report, Robertson did not find a significant difference in the amount of
credibility added to financial statements, nor did he find a significant difference in the
extent to which the auditor’s report satisfied analysts’ investment needs. He concluded
that the results suggested that audit report messages fail to convey the information
that the auditors expected would be conveyed. This result, namely that the information
in a qualified audit report did not convey the message the auditor intended, further
corroborated the findings of Libby (1979a, b) who used loan officers.
Not all of the published research, however, reached the same conclusions. Both
Shank and Dillard (1979) and Campbell and Mutchler (1988) found evidence to support
the opposite conclusion. These researchers surveyed various financial statement user
groups and financial executives, and found that they perceived the “subject to”
qualified opinion to be useful. The difference between these studies and those
previously mentioned is that Shank and Dillard (1979) and Campbell and Mutchler
(1988) merely conducted a survey and asked subjects to respond with one question
asking if they perceived qualified audit reports as useful. In the prior studies, the
subjects were not directly asked if going concern audit reports were useful. Rather,
they were asked questions about the financial position of a company with one group
receiving a qualified report and a control group receiving a clean report. The lack of
significant differences in responses was attributed to the lack of information content of
the audit report. Carmichael and Pany (1993; 1995) note, however, that when users are
placed in experimental decision making contexts, the results may be different relative
to when they are merely asked if a report is perceived as useful. Sophisticated financial
statement users may subconsciously perceive qualified audit reports as useful;
however, their perceptions and reactions to the report indicated otherwise. The
possibility remains that the perception results arise from experimental demand effects.
The year 1989 is an important demarcation point in this research. The Auditing
Standards Board (ASB) in the USA, recognizing the existence of an expectations gap,
developed new standards in order to reduce the perceived gap between auditors and
financial statement users. These were referred to as the expectation gap standards. The
standards relevant to this study are Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 58
entitled Reports on Audited Financial Statements (AICPA, 1988a) and SAS No. 59
entitled The Auditor’s Consideration of an Entity’s Ability to Continue as a Going
Concern (AICPA, 1988b). The purpose of these standards was to enhance user
understanding of auditor’s reports (SAS No. 58) and to make changes to the manner in
which a going concern uncertainty was reported should the auditor wish to qualify the
report (SAS No. 59). However, the word “qualified” was discarded and replaced with
the term “modified”. Henceforth, qualified reports were referred to as modified reports.
Miller et al. (1993) suggested that the expectation gap standards helped to clarify the
nature of the auditor’s communication with financial statement users. We now discuss
the findings of relevant studies involving the modified report.
Bamber and Stratton (1997) examined whether the information content of a modified
audit report affected the decisions of bank loan officers. The authors found that when a
loan application included a modified audit report, bank loan officers gave the application
a higher risk assessment and a higher interest rate premium. They were also

Novice and
expert judgment

349

MAJ
23,4

350

significantly less likely to grant the loan. Bamber and Stratton (1997) noted that “rather
than simply causing bank loan officers to give greater weight to the uncertainty
disclosed in the financial statements accompanying the loan application, bank loan
officers attached greater weight to the audit report itself when it contained the
explanatory paragraph”. They concluded that the report modified to reflect uncertainty
conveys information to bank loan officers. However, the information content in their
audit report related to litigation uncertainty and not going concern uncertainty. LaSalle
and Anandarajan (1997) also used loan officers. They manipulated the gravity of the
going concern uncertainty communication in the auditor’s report. They found that when
the audit report was modified with a going concern uncertainty, it did not appear to have
information content for loan officers. However, when the audit report was modified with
a disclaimer report it conveyed a very strong message to the loan officers. In one of the
more recent studies, Elias and Johnston (2001) found that the modified report did not
appear to convey significantly greater information to loan officers. Thus, the evidence
using sophisticated investors in experimental situations is not conclusive. Overall,
subject to the Bamber and Stratton (1997) study, the preponderance of evidence suggests
that, for sophisticated users of financial statements the qualified/modified report does
not appear to have significant information content.
Studies involving unsophisticated users (students)
There are not many studies involving unsophisticated users. We define
unsophisticated users as students. This may be due to the difficulties in publishing
studies using student subjects. The students used in this type of study are
predominantly MBA students, though undergraduate students have also been used.
In an early study, Reckers and Pany (1979) and Pany and Smith (1982) found that
student subjects (MBA students surrogating for financial analysts) did not perceive the
importance of information contained in audit reports. In fact, subjects could not tell
the difference between an audit report and review engagement report, apparently
equating the two with respect to reliability. Though this was not the object of their
study (the object was to compare perceived reliability of audit reports with review
engagement reports) the general conclusion is that the message conveyed in an audit
report is not clearly conveyed (understood) by the subjects. Pringle et al. (1990)
compared the new SAS 59 unqualified modified report to the superseded SAS 34
“subject to” report. They found that the student subjects did not appear to find
incremental information content in either form of report. They did find, however, that
the student’s confusion was heightened in the presence of the new modified report
where the term “subject to” – implying qualified, wording which was used prior to
SAS 59 – was now absent. Finally, Gay et al. (1998) attempted to examine how
different groups, namely, shareholders (MBA students holding stocks) and company
chief administrative officers reacted to audit reports. Unlike the other studies this was
a survey, not an experiment which manipulated the audit report. The general
conclusion was that there were no significant differences between the groups regarding
the interpretation of the audit report. If so, the “expectations gap” issue, which was a
source of concern remains so since expert understanding does not appear to differ
significantly from that of novices. We now develop theory to explain why sophisticated
and unsophisticated users may react in similar ways to the signal conveyed by the
qualified/modified auditor’s report.

Theory development based on prior literature
In accounting research, there are two different types of theories. One group of research
borrows theories from psychological literature to suggest that sophisticated and
unsophisticated users may not be significantly different with respect to decision
making. Another line of research suggests that there should be a significant difference.
Both streams of research will be considered.
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Research suggesting no difference between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors
In the accounting literature, the organization of information has been shown to affect
subjects’ going concern judgments (Ricchiute, 1992). Some studies warn that increasing
the number of cues often “overloads” decision makers, leading to judgments of lower
quality (Chewning and Harrell, 1990; Iselin, 1993; Paredes, 2003). In accounting, users are
frequently overloaded with information. These studies warn that levels of experience, the
frequent surrogate for “sophistication,” may not improve the quality of decision making.
Tversky and Kahneman (1973) indicate that availability of information and, by
extension, multiple redundancies, will result in greater understanding of the message
conveyed. Slovic and MacPhillany (1974) state that decision makers place greater
weight on common measures and, unconsciously, at measures that are repeated. Slovic
and MacPhillany (1974) demonstrate that when two alternatives have a common
attribute, along with unique attributes, the common attribute is weighted more. Payne
et al. (1993) theorize that people, irrespective of the nature of their experience
(sophistication level), choose simplifying strategies when making decisions. They note
that reliance on common attributes or an attribute that is repeated is one such
simplifying strategy; and more importantly, this form of decision making is not
deliberate, but done subconsciously. Marsh et al. (2004) argue that such simplifying
strategies may approach the normative model in accuracy, and significantly reduce the
search costs of arriving at a solution. Viger et al. (2004) note that both sophisticated and
unsophisticated users have a common attribute: they seek simplifying strategies. If so,
we should not find a significant difference between both forms of users in the presence
of financial statements including the auditor’s report.
The conclusions from cognitive and judgment research (Slovic and MacPhillany,
1974) also indicate that multiple reinforcements of the going concern contingency
should accentuate the overall message conveyed. If financial distress can be
determined from the numbers in the financial statements and from a footnote
explaining the going concern uncertainty, then modifying the auditor’s report for
the going concern uncertainty should not convey incremental information. This applies
to both sophisticated and unsophisticated users.
Finally, the placement of particular items within the financial statements has also been
shown to affect users’ judgments (though not in the context of going concern reporting).
Hopkins (1996), for example, indicated that the location or placement of securities had an
effect on financial analysts’ stock price judgments. Hirst and Hopkins (1998) showed that
presenting comprehensive income in the income statement affected financial analysts’
stock price judgments differently than presenting the information in the statement of
changes in equity. The conclusion is that specific placement of particular pieces
of information affected judgment and the use of the information by financial
statement users. In their respective studies, the subjects were sophisticated users. The
question then arises, would this finding hold for non-sophisticated investors as well?
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The findings of Hodge (2001) suggest that both non-sophisticated subjects (MBA
students) and sophisticated ones were both affected by placement[2]. That such a
normatively irrelevant factor as information placement impacted both the sophisticated
and non-sophisticated subjects is problematic for financial accounting regulators and
policy makers. It suggests that their efforts may be overcome by elements beyond their
control.
Generally then, higher levels of redundancy accentuate the signal conveyed by the
message. Hirst and Hopkins (1998) note that presentation format may affect analysts’
judgments partly because of the failure to sufficiently record information in memory.
This shortcoming can be rectified by redundancy in information presentation.
Similarly, Lipe and Salterio (2000) provide evidence that incorporating reinforcement
and providing direct links between information may help decision makers mentally
“chunk” these items and thus increase the emphasis on these items in forming
judgments. Such “chunks” are used by both sophisticated and unsophisticated users.
In this research the “items” represent the going concern information.
Research suggesting significant difference between sophisticated and unsophisticated
investors[3]
Maines and McDaniel (2000) suggest that nonprofessional users will differ
significantly, with respect to perceptions and reactions, from professional users.
This is attributed to what is referred to as “unintentional cognitive effects”. These
include factors such as overweighting certain types of information. In the accounting
literature, Joyce and Biddle (1981) and Smith and Kida (1991) show that non
-sophisticated users, due to their lack of specific task related knowledge, are more
likely than sophisticated users to fall into the trap of overweighting certain types of
information and thus making erroneous decisions. Maines and McDaniel (2000) also
note that most unsophisticated users of financial statements may possess little
knowledge (relative to sophisticated users) about the importance of specific financial
statement items or the relations among financial statement items. If this applies to the
modified going concern audit report then we should expect significant differences in
perceptions and reactions between sophisticated and unsophisticated users. Shelton
(1999) examined differences in decision making with respect to the going concern
decision between audit seniors (accepted to be less sophisticated) and audit managers
and partners (assumed to be more sophisticated). She introduced both parties to both
relevant and irrelevant information. In effect, she compared the going concern
judgments of less-experienced auditors (audit seniors) to more experienced auditors
(managers and partners). She concluded that irrelevant information “diluted” the
decision of audit seniors but not that of managers. In the most recent published study,
Lehmann and Norman (2006) investigated problem representation and judgment by
auditing professionals within the context of a going concern task and came to
conclusions that support the findings of Shelton (1999).
No research has developed a model to explain their findings. In the next section, we
develop a model to explain the findings and conclusions of prior research.
Model development
We use Brunswick’s (1955) Lens Model to explain and rationalize why the
understanding of experts and novices may not differ significantly in the presence of

a going concern report. The work of Egon Brunswick resulted in the development of an
important framework for conceptualizing and investigating human judgment. One of
Brunswick’s most basic positions was that individuals frequently must rely on
probabilistic information for the purpose of comprehending information and making
judgments in an uncertain environment. Brunswick’s framework is represented most
often in a “lens” model as shown in Figure 1.
In this lens model, the world is divided into two parts:
(1) the environmental, represented by the left side of the lens; and
(2) the individual’s judgment system, represented by the right side of the lens model.
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The three basic elements of the model are:
(1) the criterion, or distal variable about which the individual is concerned;
(2) the cues, or items of information, that may be used to judge or predict the
criterion; and
(3) the individual’s judgment or prediction.
DISTAL VARIABLES (X)

JUDGMENT(S) MADE (Z)

CRITERION VARIABLES (Y)

POINTS
COG. BIAS W

Client Fact 1

Prof'l Criteria A
POINTS

Ability 1

GOING CONCERN OPINION
Client Fact 2

COG. BIAS X
Prof'l Criteria B

or POINTS

POINTS

Ability 2
Client Fact 3

POINTS
COG. BIAS Y

or POINTS
Prof'l Criteria C

Client Fact 4

UNMODIFIED OPINION
Ability 3

or POINTS
Prof'l Criteria D

COG. BIAS Z

or POINTS

BRUNSWICK LENS MODEL LEGEND AND EXPLANATION:
X VARIABLES=DISTAL VARIABLES. THESE ARE THE ENVIRONMENTAL CUES.
Y VARIABLES=CRITERION VARIABLES. THESE ARE THE JUDGMENT CRITERIA.
Z VARIABLES=JUDGMENT MADE. SELF-EXPLANATORY.

Please note that the shapes of the criterion variables differs, suggesting that
these may be differentially important in the decision to be made.
The relationship between X and Y reflects the correspondence between the cues
as he auditor perceives them, as moderated by cognitive biases
(e.g., Availability and Anchoring) and abilities (e.g., Logico-Mathematical),
and their actual value. The placement of the Cognitive Bias and
Ability nodes reflects this mediating effect.
The number of connections shown between the X and Y variables is limited in
oeder to avoid cluttering the diagram.
The Difference in line styles between the criterion variables and judgments
is for clarity.

Figure 1.
Brunswick lens model
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With respect to this study, the environment represented by the left side of the lens, is
the analysis of the information contained in the going concern modified report. The
individual’s judgment system processes of that information in order to decide whether
to invest or lend to that company.
In our study, the three basic elements of the model are:
.
Stage 1. The criterion or distal variable. This is the presentation of the factors
causing the auditor to modify the report in the presence of going
concern uncertainties.
.
Stage 2. The cues represent the factors that the auditors cite as the reason for
modifying the auditor’s report.
.
Stage 3. The individual choice judgment involves the final choice, namely a decision
based on comprehension of the information presented in the report.
Cognitive biases and related factors affecting user reaction to the distal variable
Our concern is with the connection between the Stage one variables, which reflect the
true state of nature and Stage 2, which reflects the normative criteria that the auditor is
required to use in coming to his/her judgment, as reflected in Stage 3. We argue that the
true state of the variables in Stage 1 is not perceived perfectly by the auditor because of
intervening cognitive abilities, biases, and other distortions. Accordingly, the auditor
may fail to make the correct judgment in Stage 3. This section, then, details the
abilities, biases, and other distortions that may impact the auditor’s ability to perceive
the true correspondence between the Stage 1 and 2 variables. We do not specify all
the variables shown in Figure 1 because it would make the diagram too complicated.
We now consider the linking nodes between stage one and stage two in greater
detail. An indication of the extent to which the individual relies upon cues and
perceives them correctly, both individually and in combination with one or more
others, has to be explained theoretically. It is important to emphasize that we use
cognitive factors not motivational or conflict-of-interest factors to explain differences
(or lack thereof) between experts and novices. These cognitive factors are referred to by
Tversky and Kahneman (1973) as heuristics and biases. Tversky and Kahneman
discuss three types of heuristics: these are representativeness, availability and
anchoring and adjustment. These, and additional cognitive and related issues that
have appeared in the literature, will be considered individually. We assert that they
may act to distort the auditors’ understanding of the correspondence between the client
condition and the criterion against which the client’s condition is to be judged.
Representativeness. A person who follows this heuristic evaluates the probability of
an uncertain event, or a sample, by the degree to which it is:
.
similar in essential properties to its present population; and
.
reflects the salient features of the process by which it is generated.
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1972, p. 431). Events that are more representative often are
better understood than less representative events. In our study, since unqualified
reports have a much higher probability of occurrence and are more representative, the
bias would be towards understanding the message contained in an unqualified format
but not necessarily the message in a modified format. The question is: does this apply
to both experts and novices? Interestingly, Lundberg and Nagle (1999) imply that if

subjects are not experienced, a major characteristic of representativeness is
insensitivity to the information presented. Hence, they imply that novices may be
biased by the representativeness characteristic (i.e. understand the message contained
in the representative report (unmodified report) but not the report which is
unrepresentative (the modified report)).
Availability. Another heuristic identified by Tversky and Kahneman (1973) is
availability. “A person is said to employ the availability heuristic whenever he estimates
frequency or probability by the ease with which instances or associations can be brought
to mind” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, p. 208). The ability to retrieve instances or
associations may depend on familiarity, salience and latest occurrence. The availability
heuristic provides an explanation for what Ashton (1982) refers to as the “illusory
correlation”. Thus, when a person finds that the association between items is strong, s/he
is likely to conclude that an event is likely to occur in the presence of another. With
respect to this study, the presence of red flags may provide a warning signal to experts
due to the availability heuristic (perceived correlation between the red flags and
bankruptcy). However, novices with no prior experience may not be affected by the
availability heuristic and that could affect their judgment. In the context of Figure 1,
then, the availability heuristic may distort the decision maker’s apprehension of the true
nature of the distal variable. That is, she/he may view it as reflecting a condition that it is
not because of the decision maker’s greater recall of certain events rather than others.
Anchoring and adjustment. The third heuristic identified by Tversky and
Kahneman (1973) is anchoring and adjustment. They argue that individuals often
make estimates by establishing some initial value (an anchor) that may be suggested
by the task or may be the result of a partial computation, and then making
some adjustment to this initial value. Ashton and Ashton (1988) notes that anchoring
and adjustment may explain many of the problems individuals have in probability
assessment. Ashton notes that estimated probabilities of compound events are
systematically biased in the direction of the probabilities of the sample events that
compute them. In the presence of a modified report, an expert may “anchor” their
decision to either not lend or invest. Any further information results in adjustments to
the anchor. The anchor of a novice, on the other hand, may be towards providing a loan
due to the combined effect of the other two biases discussed earlier. Further,
experienced auditors may be more willing to make adjustments to their anchor based
on new information. Novices, however, may cleave more to their original anchor.
Abilities. Abilities may be conceptualized as the upper limit on the individual’s
capacities in any number of domains. Although ability is not a cognitive heuristic, we
believe that it should be discussed also since it sets the ceiling on achievement. In the
context of Figure 1, ability represents the extent of the decision maker’s power to
understand the true correlation between the distal and the criterion variables.
Stanovich et al. (2004) found a negative correlation between SAT scores, a widely
acknowledged surrogate for intelligence quotient scores, and susceptibility to use of
cognitive heuristics. Abilities may differ between those who can accurately be
classified as experts and those who are best described as novices. Gardner (1999)
describes eight different kinds of intelligences. Logico-mathematical intelligence seems
most likely to impact understanding financial statement matters and audit reports.
Individuals whose abilities lie primarily in the musical, artistic, and other realms, for
example, are less likely to accurately appreciate the meaning and content of
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audit reports. Typically, the profession’s normative standard for financial statement
presentation is to prepare statements that are meaningful to a reasonably sophisticated
investor who is willing to invest time in understanding them. Many members of the
user community, however, have abilities that are not of the logico-mathematical realm.
Presumably, such individuals could only develop a reasonable understanding of the
audit reports and/or the accompanying financial statements via enormous effort. This
suggests that the normative standard must fail before this test. Expertise may be
developable without ability, but that may be difficult.
Krampe and Baltes (2003) distinguish between ability and expertise. Ability derives
from both nature and nurture. Expertise, on the other hand, reflects the investment of
extensive time and effort resources. The practice explicit in this effort creates a much
greater understanding of the various nuances that financial statements may have and
develops context knowledge and a database of experience concerning the relationship
between audit reports and financial statement reality. This practice helps cement the
newly acquired knowledge and helps the user form connections between any particular
combination of an audit report and a set of financial statements to a broader collection
of audit reports and financial statements. Over time, the linkages between different
audit reports and related financial statements would solidify into sets of rules for
understanding the import of such combinations. Those with lesser levels of
logico-mathematical abilities, however, would have a much greater difficulty in
forming those connections. . . or require much more than a reasonable effort to acquire
the same. Other issues also divide those with and without expertise in the
accounting/auditing domain. We will address those next.
Memory matching. Ability is useless without experience since no one is born
understanding the relationship between financial statement information and audit
reports. Experience leads to development of what Ericsson (2003) calls mental
representations of the problem area. Possessing this, they can then quickly link
presenting facts to their pre-existing mental representations, understand the
concordances and dissimilarities between them, and come to a conclusion.
Since experts can understand new domain information more quickly than can the
unsophisticated or novice user, experts can improve their capacity relative to
non-experts (Willingham, 2006; Hirsch, 2006; for a contrary view, see Gladwell, 2005).
Part of this advantage in learning comes from the expert’s ability to match new
information to pre-existing information. In effect, the rich get richer. To the extent that
memory is unreliable, however, the lessons learned may be incorrect. Thus, in the
context of Figure 1, the decision maker does not understand the true association
between the distal and criterion variables, leading to an incorrect decision.
Affective heuristic. Psychological defensiveness and poor intrapersonal ability
might prevent even experts from learning from experience about the appropriateness
of given audit reports, conditional on financial statement and related contextual
information. If so, there would be a weakening of the link between ability, the
acquisition of experience, and the accuracy of the auditor’s determinations of the
proper form of audit reports. From a relative novice’s point of view, regardless of
ability type, however, such psychological factors as anxiety over being confronted with
unfamiliar decision situations, the characteristic over-optimism in one’s future and
overconfidence in one’s decision-making prowess will all combine to make it more
difficult for the novice to develop expertise (Finucane et al., 2003). Effort aversion and a

low level of what Stanovich et al. (2003) call “thinking disposition” may further
undermine the novice’s development of expertise. Thinking dispositions, as Stanovich
et al. (2003) describe it, consists of a willingness to remain open-minded, seeking
contrary or alternate points-of-view and information, and to work hard to understand
the underlying logic of a presenting situation. Thus, emotion and effort aversion may
cloud the relative novice’s understanding of the link between the distal and criterion
variables in Figure 1, leading to a poor judgment outcome.
Perceptual clarity. Although not technically a cognitive heuristic, perceptual clarity
(the ability to perceive the world as it exists) influences the link between the reality of the
distal cues and the expert or novice’s decisions with respect to them. For example, memory
matching fails if the expert perceives the presenting situation incorrectly and believes an
inappropriate opinion is appropriate. With regard to novices, their understanding of the
distal object (the presenting financial condition of the client) is likely to be problematic to
begin with since their ability to determine the true nature of these cues is likely to be far
more limited than that of the expert. Once one adds in problems born of a lack of perceptual
clarity, the initial problems that the novice many have had in understanding what a correct
audit report should have been, as well as the true meaning of the audit report that was
given, is compounded. The result will be an inadequate analysis of the situation and the
choice of an incorrect solution. Whether we are discussing experts or novices, thinking
dispositions will lose some of their effectiveness when an incorrect perception of a
situation leads to a line of reasoning based on a wrong premise. Even without other
problems, the failure to perceive the distal variable correctly must led to a poor
understanding of its fit with the criterion variable! Thus, there is a poor link between the
distal variable in Figure 1 and the criterion variable.
Schemata (mental models). Another difference between experts and novices
in understanding either the presenting information that is normatively to be relied on in
arriving at a going concern opinion, or in understanding the true import of such an opinion
once rendered, is that of problem representations. The goal of standards like SAS59 is to
provide guidelines for the auditor (here, the expert) in deciding on the appropriateness of a
going concern report for a given client. In effect, the range of material to be considered may
be narrowed in some circumstances, but expanded for others. A difference between
principles-based and rules-based accounting is that in the latter case, the auditors are
given explicit, attention-directing guidance on the factors to consider. With a
principles-based approach, however, the auditors may look to the substance of the
situation as they perceive the substance to be. Auditors/experts, of course, may always
apply professional judgment in coming to their conclusion, whichever regime is in force.
This may have been behind the findings of Lundberg and Nagle (1999).
Expert judgment is notoriously inconsistent across experts (Sternberg and
Grigorenko, 2003; Gladwell, 2005). In terms of the going concern opinion, one auditor
may have a specific mental model consisting of SAS No. 59 and his/her own preferred
extensions of considerations involved in arriving at a going concern decision and may
specify a solution in terms of that mental model. Another auditor may have in mind a
different mental model and a different interpretation of the problem, and so the two
auditors will disagree (Stanovich et al., 2004). A mental model may be seen as a “frame”
that forms the basis within which further discussions of a problem are understood.
Frames may affect the ways that the auditor’s perceive and understand the criteria set
forth by SAS No. 59 and the client’s presenting situation.
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Libby and Luft (1993), for example, noted that practising auditors develop schemata
against which situational evidence is weighed. Novices will not have well-developed criteria.
To them, depending on their levels of financial sophistication and logico-mathematical
ability, as well as effort expended in mastering financial information, the presenting going
concern information may be a “blooming, buzzing confusion.” (pace William James). With
regard to Figure 1, then, the mental model may affect the decision maker’s take on the distal
variable, distorting its interpretation with the result that it is misunderstood, and/or that is
perceived differently by a different decision-maker.
Selective perception and confirmation bias. Other things will interfere with the
correct perception of the criterion variables. For example, expecting to see something
will influence or bias what is seen. That is, people seek information that is consistent
with their own views or hypotheses, and disregard or downplay contrary or conflicting
evidence. In part, this is related to perceptual clarity in that only a subset of the entire
field of information is perceived. Selective perception, then, suggests that the
decision-maker will apprehend only part of the distal cues being provided to him, and
this, therefore, will distort his/her ability to meaningfully apply the criterion values.
Confirmation bias has the same impact. It suggests that an expert expecting to see a
“healthy” corporation will tend to notice evidence that is consistent with this view. The
implications for the connection between distal and criterion variables in Figure 1, and
the resulting decision, should be self-explanatory.
This confirmation bias has been confirmed within the auditing domain (Nelson and
Tan, 2005). A novice, in contrast to an expert, may have very limited ideas as to what is
or is not important. Therefore, selective perception may not operate as forcefully for
them, as they view the contents of financial statements, as for the expert. While it may
seem that the novice, therefore, has the upper hand in understanding the going concern
status of a firm, the guidance that the profession provides to the expert hopefully guides
the latter’s eye toward the broader field of evidence with regard to the financial status
of the corporation. The “check the box” approach to accounting/auditing guidance
therefore forces accountants/auditors to pay attention to a wider range of variables.
Frequency/illusory correlation and the law of small numbers. Illusory correlation is
said to exist when a decision-maker believes that two variables are correlated when
they are not. Also, the law of small numbers suggests that people generalize based on a
few observations. Expert auditors are more likely to have a wide experience with firms
that have, or are considered good candidates for, going concern status. Given that, the
experts in this case are less likely to make an error in giving, or understanding the
meaning of, a going concern opinion. In contrast, novices looking at the distal criteria
may have very limited knowledge of the determinants of going concern status and may
generalize to any particular firm information that they believe they know about a few
other firms. For the novices then, in terms of Figure 1, they are less likely to understand
the true relationship between a given distal and a given criterion variable than
otherwise. Obviously, the possibility of error is very high in this situation.
Interestingly, though, Lundberg and Nagle (1999) found that their auditor sample was
less likely to believe that stimulus firms merited a going concern opinion than was
their novice group. The novice group actually predicted going concern status more
accurately! This result suggests that knowledge may bias experts in that they may be
more likely to indulge in nuanced argument that ends up leading them astray. This
bias will not exist with novices.

Halo effect. With the halo effect, the entire person or object is evaluated based on the
assessment of one main trait. If other traits are uncorrelated with the key trait, then an
error will occur. With respect to our concern, a novice may fail to understand the
determinants of a going concern opinion and believe that the presence of a “name”
auditor conferring an unqualified, standard, audit report serves as a guarantee of the
viability of the corporation and its future. In this case, it might be argued, the novice
anchors on the auditor’s reputation and fails to pursue other information that may
reside in the financial statements. With respect to Figure 1, then, it is as if the novice
focuses on one distal variable and allows its value to outweigh the cue information
provided by the others! The impact of these others on other criterion variables then
gets ignored!
Field dependence or independence. This describes the extent to which an individual
can separate a logically distinct element (figure) from the background surrounding it.
It has also been characterized as one’s ability to identify the central issue (Nelson and
Tan, 2005). Pincus (1990), for example, found that auditors with greater field
independence were more likely to disagree with the client’s stated inventory figures.
With respect to our concern, then, it is likely that the expert is more likely to
disentangle the meaning of the audit report from the background of the financial
statements with which the report is associated. The novice user, in contrast, is more
likely to be more field dependent since the novice doesn’t have the cognitive skills to
understand the distinct roles of the audit reports and statements. Thus, in terms of
Figure 1, the novice is less likely to understand the distal variables clearly since he/she
cannot separate any one from the others present.
Summary and conclusions
This topic is important because the role of training on judgment (the going concern
task in this paper) is pivotal in decision making. As mentioned above, this is
particularly relevant in the presence of a move to principles-based rather than
rule-based accounting systems. In particular, we provide a theoretical model to address
the issue: does expertise enhance the quality of judgment? In real life, the
problem-solving process starts with an individual making a mental representation of a
problem. Based on this representation, an individual then develops a strategy with
respect to the issuance of the going concern modified report. This is our focus. We
selected this because the going concern decision is influenced by many factors
including financial distress, bad news items, good news items and the auditor’s
personal relationship with the client, with the latter being a partial function of client
tenure with the auditor. In certain cases, the going concern decision is routine (i.e. the
level of financial distress or a major lawsuit against the company which has a high
probability of succeeding clearly indicates the company is going to fail). In other cases,
they may be more complex (i.e. financial distress ratios are not conclusive and many
other factors have to be considered). The differences between novices and experts with
respect to the going concern decision are not significant in the presence of a less
complex or more routine situation. Both parties use heuristics in the same way.
However, in a more complex situation, novices may rely more on heuristics relative to
experts, with the difference in decision making being significant.
Theoretically, we show through the framework of the Brunswick Lens Model (1955),
adapted to clarify its relevance to our concerns that heuristic biases result in novices
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falling into the trap of misinterpreting and misperceiving certain types of information.
In particular, novices (as compared to experts) are influenced by:
.
Representativeness (i.e. less able to deal with an event that has a low probability
of occurrence).
.
Availability (conclude, in the presence of red flags that likelihood of firm failure is
strong, whereas experienced auditors would factor in mitigating events prior to
making a decision).
.
Anchoring (i.e. be stuck on an “anchor” when weighting criteria, and hence be
less flexible in making adjustments which an experienced auditor may be more
amenable to).
In addition, as we note, going concern decision-making is also a function of ability,
memory matching, selective perception, “illusory correlation” affect heuristics, field
dependence/independence and halo effects. In the case of halo effects, novices may be
more amenable to issuing an unmodified report for large firms with a strong
reputation, whereas experienced auditors may not succumb to the effect.
This paper has implications for the training of auditors, especially novices. Current
training and education adopts traditional, textbook and theory oriented approaches.
However, studies show that this approach may not reduce the chasm between novices
and experienced auditors with respect to the going concern decision (Lehmann and
Norman, 2006). The going concern task is difficult since, as Lehmann and Norman
note, it involves a focused evaluation of large amounts of information to concisely
“diagnose” financial health, and requires auditors to continue to gather information
until they are convinced that sufficient evidence exists to issue a going concern report.
We show, using traditional behavioral theory, that novices could be affected by a
number of heuristics to which experienced auditors may not succumb. This has
implications for training. An understanding that heuristics and biases such as the halo
effect could influence judgment in going concern evaluation can aid in developing
training practices based on case studies and also aid in the development of expert
systems that facilitate training, In particular, in order to reduce the chasm, novices
need to comprehend the importance of the following:
.
The identification of important domain-related information and the ability to
perceive meaningful patterns in data.
.
The need to spend more time analyzing problems at a deeper level prior to
attempting a solution.
.
The willingness to withhold judgment until all feasible relevant knowledge has
been gathered.
.
Ability to organize knowledge.
.
Willingness to countenance information that contradicts one’s personal beliefs.
.
Ability to filter information and to package and encapsulate details.
Novices, like their more experienced counterparts, also need self-knowledge with
respect to where their abilities fundamentally lie. Without that understanding, the
individuals are even more likely to be subject to the characteristic overconfidence that
afflicts much of decision-making.

This paper addresses a key gap in extant literature on expert versus novice
judgment in auditing. Previous literature did not address many cognitive factors that
may importantly impact auditing-related decisions. Our study, therefore, usefully
expands on this literature to suggest fruitful field for further research. We have made
suggestions above with respect to additional ways of training audit practitioners to
develop not only book expertise, but expertise effective in the field, not the classroom.
Even so, research is needed to understand whether our suggestions above, drawn from
non-auditing literatures, are the best way to proceed within the auditing arena. Even if
our suggestions are preferable, it is necessary to understand what constitutes an
effective training tool within the auditing domain.
Beyond training tools, it is also important to understand how to structure jobs in the
field in order to draw the auditor’s attention to important features of the environment.
In this vein, during the 1980s, there was much research into the ways that different
auditing firms structured the work of their auditors (Cushing and Loebbecke, 1986).
For example, some firms (Arthur Andersen among them) used highly mechanistic
approaches to structuring the auditor’s work. The highly mechanistic approach
involved heavy use of audit checklists, detailed procedures manuals, requirements for
documentation, etc. In contrast to the highly mechanistic approach was the more
judgment-oriented approach usually attributed to PriceWaterhouse. In this approach,
professional judgment was prized and the auditor was given a great deal of leeway in
deciding, for example, how much evidence was enough. Aside from the kind of
institutional, cultural, incentive-system factors that may influence auditor judgment
(Kleinman and Palmon, 2001), it is important to understand how effective these tools
are at drawing the auditor’s attention to normatively important facets of the
environment, and away from distracting factors.
Certainly we believe that it is important to develop more sophisticated ways of
detecting the influence of extraneous factors on auditor judgment. Are there ways to
force audit decision-makers to seek and use information in a non-biased way? Above,
we recommended the use of techniques to get the auditor to think through presenting
situations more open-mindedly, and more thoroughly than may be the case. Are those
effective methods within the auditing domain, and especially with regard to a decision
that involves as many somewhat amorphous factors of interest as the going concern
decision? That is an empirical question, one, we believe, that it is important to answer.
Further, are there ways to immunize the audit firm decision-makers from the pressures
of presenting audit situations, as well as the wider client load that the audit firm
decision-makers must bear? While the CEOs of the major auditing firms recommend
the following (“Serving global capital markets and the global economy: a view from the
CEOs of the international audit networks” November, 2006, Global Public Policy
Symposium, 2006, p. 2):
The auditing profession needs to develop the talent and expertise to deliver consistent,
high-quality audit services in the coming environment, both through hiring of outstanding
individuals and the training of auditors in new auditing techniques. We suspect that the
problem lies in the words talent and expertise. That is why understanding how to make book
expertise into an effective force in the field is important.

In this paper we provide a theoretical framework to show how this can be attained.
We believe, furthermore, that our model contains important new insights into
the judgment process in auditing. There are limitations to this, as any study.
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For example, we present a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding
judgment failures in an auditing area where the rules are relatively unstructured. Just
how well does our argument pertain to much more structured decisions? Further, while
there is a very strong argument for the training tools that the literature suggests, it is
important as well to test their impact in practice. In sum, therefore, we believe that we
have provided fruitful avenues for further exploration, but avenues that ultimately
require empirical as well as theoretical exploration to advance the field.
Notes
1. Interestingly, James Quiqley, the CEO of Deloitte and Touche noted that a departure from
rules-based auditing may subject the auditing profession to greater litigation risk since it
will be more difficult to document the auditor’s adherence to auditing standards if a
“check-the-box” system is not used. He argued for the creation of a “framework for actions
that a preparer [company] or auditor can take – a layer of guidance that would sit on top of a
set of principles-based standards.” He did not specify the contents of this guidance but we
believe that it is reasonable to infer that procedures would be recommended that would help
avert judgment errors (Grant, 2007).
2. This was not the intended objective of Hodge’s (2001) study. The objective related to
examining effectiveness of understanding and analyzing hyperlinking information with
financial statements. He found that MBA students were as effective as financial analysts.
3. The issue of the relative judgments of experienced (sophisticated) investors versus
non-sophisticated investors takes on especial importance given the findings of Lundberg and
Nagle (1999). Lundquist and Nagle examined the going concern judgments of audit firm
personnel and MBA students. Their intent was to examine the effects of post-decision
bolstering and justification once the experimental and control groups were (were not) given
outcome information. Both groups were provided with information, stripped of identifying
information, on firms that subsequently went bankrupt. The MBA students were about
twice as likely to indicate that a going concern opinion should be issued as were the audit
firm personnel. The importance of this study lies in both its unaccountable results and the
fact that it is a rarity. We were unable to locate other studies that examined the effect of
cognitive heuristics on the issuance of audit opinions. The Lundberg and Nagle study was
published in a non-accounting journal. No such studies were found in accounting journals.
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